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On February 26, 2007, the international court oF Justice (ICJ or the Court) issued its opinion in the Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro).1 In its first judg-
ment interpreting the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of   the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention),2 
the Court held that that the massacre of Bosnian Muslims at 
Srebrenica in July 1995 amounted to genocide, but at the same 
time determined that there was not enough evidence to find 
Serbia directly responsible or even complicit in that genocide. 
Nevertheless, in its landmark ruling, the Court also found that 
Serbia had violated the Genocide Convention by failing to pre-
vent the massacre and, later, by failing to punish those respon-
sible for the killings in Srebrenica. 
Initial reactions to the judgment were mixed. While one 
paper’s headlines characterized the Court’s ruling as having 
“[c]lear[ed] Serbia of Genocide,”3 another summed up the judg-
ment as “Court Declares Bosnia Killings Were Genocide.”4 
Months later, at the first international genocide conference held 
in Sarajevo since the 1992–1995 conflict,5 the emotional inten-
sity of the reactions to the judgment was palpable. While some 
characterized the verdict as another “betrayal” by the interna-
tional community, others lauded the Court’s judgment, claiming 
it had finally to put to rest the question of whether Serbia had 
orchestrated the genocide. Still others expressed disappointment 
with the Court, noting that it failed to resolve many of the con-
troversial questions raised in the case. The confusion over what 
the Court’s complex and lengthy judgment actually held, and the 
continuing controversy over whether the decision is a win or a 
loss for either side, highlights the need for a closer reading and 
more accurate understanding of the Court’s analysis.
BaCkgrounD oF the CaSe
The case, filed by Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1993, alleged 
that during the 1992–1995 conflict, the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY) (which after 2001 became known as Serbia 
and Montenegro, and later as Serbia, following the secession of 
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Montenegro in June 2006) was responsible for mass killings and 
other atrocities committed against Bosnian Muslims in viola-
tion of the Genocide Convention. Specifically, Bosnia alleged 
that “under the guise of protecting the Serbian population of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, [Serbia] in fact conceived and shared 
with them the vision of a ‘Greater Serbia,’ in pursuit of which it 
gave its support to those persons and groups responsible for the 
activities which constitute the genocidal acts complained of.”6
Although Serbia disputed certain facts, such as the actual 
number of deaths in Srebrenica, it did not deny that crimes were 
committed during the conflict. In fact, it conceded that certain 
acts could be “characterized as war crimes and certain even 
as crimes against humanity.”7 However, Serbia disputed the 
allegation that these acts had been committed with the requisite 
genocidal intent.8 More significantly, it claimed that the acts 
could not be attributed to Serbia, as they had been carried out 
by the army of the Republika Srpska (VRS), the Bosnian Serb 
entity that retained de facto control over a substantial part of ter-
ritory after Bosnia and Herzegovina’s secession from the former 
Yugoslavia.9 
SigniFiCanCe oF the iCJ’S opinion
Aside from the Court’s complicated and controversial analy-
sis of whether it had jurisdiction over Serbia, which has been 
extensively addressed by other commentators, several critical 
aspects of the Court’s judgment are worth mentioning from the 
outset. First, the Court was limited to assessing Serbia’s respon-
sibility for alleged acts of genocide.10 Thus, the decision does 
not deal with Serbia’s responsibility for war crimes or crimes 
against humanity, which the Court was careful to suggest, in 
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QueStionS raiSeD By the Court’S opinion
Despite the landmark nature of the decision, the Court’s 
analysis raises a number of critical questions which merit further 
discussion. Although the judgment will likely be the subject of 
much commentary in years to come, three issues in particular 
stand out as worthy of note.
the Court’S DeCiSion not to  
Seek the BeSt poSSiBle eviDenCe 
The first issue relates to the question of why the Court chose 
not to use, or even seek, the best possible evidence. On two sep-
arate occasions, Bosnia requested unedited copies of documents 
containing minutes of the meetings of the Supreme Defence 
Council of Serbia,22 the country’s highest decision-making body 
at the time of the conflict, made up of Yugoslavia’s top political 
and military leadership. The documents have been characterized 
as “the best inside view of Serbia’s role in the Bosnian war of 
1992–1995.”23 As the Vice-President of the Court Judge Awn 
Shawkat al-Khasawneh noted in his dissent, “[i]t is a reasonable 
expectation that those documents would have shed light on the 
central questions” facing the Court.24 
Under the ICJ Statute, the Court could have asked Serbia to 
produce these documents in their entirety, or at the very least 
officially noted Serbia’s failure to produce uncensored copies.25 
Nevertheless, the Court chose to do neither,26 noting instead that 
Bosnia had “extensive documentation and other evidence avail-
able to it, especially from the readily accessible ICTY records”27 
— as if, in the words of one commentator, “having access to 
a mountain of less probative evidence could compensate for 
evidence withheld by Serbia precisely because it was crucial to 
Bosnia’s case.”28 The Court’s failure to explain why it chose not 
to pursue this evidence understandably raises questions about 
whether the Court had before it all the evidence necessary to 
make an accurate legal determination of Serbia’s responsibility 
in this case.
the Court’S DeCiSion to apply a high  
StanDarD oF prooF But not to unDertake  
a CuMulative analySiS oF the eviDenCe 
The second question raised by the judgment relates to the 
standard of proof applied by the Court and its analysis of the 
evidence under that standard. Genocide is difficult to prove, 
primarily because in addition to the material act, a finding of 
genocide requires proof of the specific intent to destroy the pro-
tected group.29 Specifically, “[i]t is not enough that the members 
of the group are targeted because they belong to that group, that 
is because the perpetrator has a discriminatory intent. Something 
more is required. The acts listed in [the Genocide Convention] 
must be done with intent to destroy the group as such in whole 
or in part.”30 
In terms of the level of proof required to meet that standard, 
the Court rejected Bosnia’s suggestion that it merely had to 
prove its case on the “balance of probabilities.” Instead, the 
Court relied on its earlier jurisprudence to conclude that “claims 
against a State involving charges of exceptional gravity must be 
proved by evidence that is fully conclusive.”31 The Court stated 
that it had to “be fully convinced” that allegations of genocide, 
or complicity in genocide, have been “clearly established.”32 
Although it added that “[t]he same standard applies to the proof 
several parts of its opinion, might be established on the basis of 
the evidence before it.11
Second, although the Court was not fully convinced that the 
acts of violence that took place in parts other than Srebrenica 
were committed with the specific intent to destroy, in whole 
or in part, members of a protected group under the Genocide 
Convention,12 the judgment eliminates any doubt about whether 
Bosnian Muslims suffered atrocious harms during the war. The 
Court affirmed that it “has been established by fully conclusive 
evidence that members of the protected group were systemati-
cally victims of massive mistreatment, beatings, rape, and tor-
ture causing serious bodily and mental harm, during the conflict 
and, in particular, in the detention camps.”13 
Similarly, although the Court failed to find enough evidence 
to conclude that Serbia could be held responsible for genocide, 
the Court’s judgment recognized that: 1) “there is much evi-
dence of direct or indirect participation by the official army of 
the FRY, along with the Bosnian Serb armed forces, in military 
operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the years prior to the 
events at Srebrenica”14 and, more significantly, 2) the “FRY was 
in a position of influence, over the Bosnian Serbs who devised 
and implemented the genocide in Srebrenica . . . owing to the 
strength of the political, military and financial links between 
FRY on the one hand and the Republika Srpska and the VRS on 
the other, which, though somewhat weaker than in the preced-
ing period, nonetheless remained very close.”15 Thus, although 
the Court’s decision falls short of finding Serbia responsible 
for genocide, it leaves little room for doubt that Serbia was 
involved in the events leading up to and during the genocide in 
Srebrenica. 
Third, the Court found that a State can be held respon-
sible for genocide without an individual being convicted of the 
crime.16 Although the Genocide Convention does not expressly 
require States to refrain from committing genocide themselves, 
the Court concluded that States’ obligation to prevent genocide 
under the Convention implies that States, not just individuals, 
are prohibited from committing genocide.17 This is significant 
because the Court relied extensively on evidentiary findings 
made by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY or the Tribunal) in cases where individuals 
had been charged with genocide,18 and that tribunal has yet to 
convict any individual of committing (as opposed to aiding and 
abetting) genocide.19
This leads to the final, and perhaps, most significant pre-
liminary observation about the Court’s judgment. Not only was 
this the first time since the Genocide Convention was adopted 
in 1948 that the ICJ heard and issued a judgment on a dispute 
over an alleged violation of the Convention, but it was also the 
first time a State was actually held responsible for violating the 
Convention, in particular by failing to take the necessary steps 
to prevent genocide. The import of this particular ruling cannot 
be overstated. According to the majority, a State need not know 
that genocide is underway or is about to occur in order for the 
obligation to prevent to be triggered; rather it is sufficient that 
the State knew that there “was a serious risk of genocide.”20 
As another commentator has pointed out, the “Court put to rest 
States’ all-too-familiar claim that it is unclear whether they must 
act to prevent genocide in the face of ambiguous facts that are 
unambiguously menacing: If they wait until it is legally certain, 
they have waited too long to prevent it.”21 
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of attribution for such acts,” the Court appears to have adopted 
an even higher standard when reviewing the facts in support 
of Bosnia’s state responsibility claim, noting that it had “not 
been established beyond any doubt” that Serbia had supplied 
the Bosnian Serb army with aid and assistance at the time when 
Serbian authorities were “clearly aware that genocide was about 
to take place or was under way.”33 The question of whether this 
was an appropriate application of the standard is highlighted by 
the fact that four of the 15 judges dissented from the Court’s 
conclusion that there was not enough evidence to find Serbia 
complicit in the genocide at Srebrenica.34
A more troubling aspect of the Court’s decision is its 
apparent failure to consider the evidence in a cumulative man-
ner, leading to a more limited use of inference than arguably 
required. For instance, although the Court was “fully convinced” 
that the evidence established the systematic mistreatment — 
including “beatings, rape, and torture causing serious bodily 
and mental harm”35 — of Bosnian Muslims in locations other 
than in Srebrenica, it concluded that demonstrating genocidal 
intent through the “very pattern of the atrocities committed over 
many communities, over a lengthy period, focused on Bosnian 
Muslims” is too broad a proposition, with which “the Court 
cannot agree.”36 
Notably, the Court’s approach here appears to be at odds 
with the jurisprudence of the ICTY, which must apply the higher 
“beyond reasonable doubt” standard37 and yet has repeatedly 
held that in the absence of smoking gun evidence of intent, the 
Tribunal can derive genocidal intent from circumstantial evi-
dence, including pattern evidence of abuses against the protected 
group.38 Although the ICTY has cautioned that when inferential 
evidence is relied upon to prove genocidal intent, the “inference 
must be the only reasonable inference available on the evi-
dence,”39 it has nonetheless indicated a willingness to consider 
such evidence in its analysis of intent. For instance, in an early 
decision in the case of Prosecutor v. Karadžić & Mladić, the 
ICTY found that the means used to achieve the objective of what 
the Tribunal termed “ethnic cleansing,” including the systematic 
rape of women, tended to show that the acts were designed to 
reach “the very foundations of the group.”40 The Tribunal con-
cluded that, in combination with other factors, the systematic 
rape of the kind perpetrated during the Bosnian conflict could 
provide circumstantial evidence of genocidal intent. 41 
A similar approach could have been used to analyze whether 
the massive mistreatment that the Court found had occurred in 
areas outside Srebrenica, particularly in the detention camps, 
could in itself have contributed to an analysis of genocidal 
intent. Likewise, the Court could have used its finding that 
there was “conclusive evidence of the deliberate destruction of 
the historical, cultural and religious heritage of the protected 
group during the period in question”42 as further evidence of 
intent. Indeed, earlier in the opinion, it endorsed the proposition 
made by the ICTY in the Krstić case that although the destruc-
tion of cultural and religious property cannot be considered a 
genocidal act, such attacks may be considered as evidence of 
intent to physically destroy the group.43 The nature of these acts, 
combined with the massive scale of their destructive effect, as 
well as Serbia’s own statements,44 might have been sufficient 
to derive the requisite genocidal intent. However, the Court 
failed to undertake a cumulative analysis of such evidence, at 
least with respect to the atrocities that were committed in areas 
outside Srebrenica. The Court’s failure to consider the evidence 
in a holistic or collective manner is disconcerting, particularly 
in light of the fact that, as mentioned earlier, the Court also 
refused to draw any conclusions from Serbia’s failure to turn 
over unedited copies of the Supreme Defence Council docu-
ments. As Judge al-Khasawneh observed, “[i]t would normally 
be expected that the consequences of [the Court’s noting such a 
refusal] would be to shift the onus probandi or to allow a more 
liberal recourse to inference.” This, however, was not the posi-
tion taken by the Court’s majority.
the Court’S relianCe on the  
JuriSpruDenCe oF the iCty 
The third question relates to the extent to which the Court 
was guided by the jurisprudence the ICTY. In assessing the 
parties’ claims, the Court examined a vast amount of evidence, 
including UN reports, submissions from States as well as from 
inter- and non-governmental organizations, newspaper articles, 
and expert witnesses.45 Significantly, the Court also considered 
findings of fact made by the ICTY, stating that “in principle 
[they would be] accept[ed] as highly persuasive” and adding that 
the ICTY’s evaluation of intent based on those adjudicated facts 
was entitled to “due weight.”46  
For instance, in arriving at its conclusions regarding the 
absence of genocidal intent with respect to the atrocities com-
mitted in areas outside Srebrenica, the Court appears to have 
been heavily influenced by judgments in which the ICTY found 
genocidal intent lacking.47 Yet, at the same time, the Court seems 
to have been reluctant to rely on other aspects of the ICTY’s 
jurisprudence, including, as noted above, the Tribunal’s use of 
circumstantial evidence to prove genocidal intent in the absence 
of smoking gun evidence of such intent.48 The Court’s incon-
sistent approach to the relevance of ICTY jurisprudence begs 
the question: if the Court did not feel persuaded to conduct the 
kind of cumulative analysis of circumstantial evidence endorsed 
by the ICTY, why did it fail to conduct its own analysis of the 
evidence instead of relying on ICTY judgments to support its 
conclusion that evidence of intent was lacking? In other words, 
if it found the ICTY’s approach to the evidence unpersuasive, 















The International Court of Justice recently ruled that the Srebrenica 
massacre amounted to genocide, but declined to find Serbia respon-
sible for the event.
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Unfortunately, the inconsistency in the Court’s reliance on the 
ICTY’s findings and analysis can lend itself to the perception 
that the ICJ had reasons other than a strictly legal interpretation 
of the facts in coming to its conclusions. 
Equally significant is the fact that the Court appears to 
have been selective when taking into account the difference in 
the nature of the cases that it and the ICTY are called upon to 
decide. For instance, whereas in justifying its rejection of the 
ICTY’s “overall control” test the Court highlights the difference 
between the nature of state involvement required to characterize 
a conflict as international and the nature of state involvement 
required to give rise to state responsibility,49 it fails to mention 
the distinction between the civil nature of its proceedings and 
the criminal nature of the ICTY’s proceedings when using the 
ICTY’s findings to support its conclusion regarding the absence 
of genocidal intent.50 Citing ICTY jurisprudence in support of its 
own conclusions without careful and consistent consideration of 
the nature and context in which each of these courts functions 
threatens to undermine the soundness of the Court’s analysis.
ConCluSion
although others, including many present at the international 
genocide conference held in Sarajevo,51 have addressed various 
political and practical consequences of the ICJ’s judgment, a 
few final observations are worth highlighting. The first is that 
the ICJ’s ruling regarding Serbia’s violation of the obligation to 
punish perpetrators of genocide, including by failing to turn over 
ICTY indictee General Ratko Mladić to the Tribunal,52 clearly 
gives the ICTY additional leverage to request that States assist it 
in persuading Serbia to hand over to the Tribunal indictees who 
remain at large.53 This is significant, given that the Tribunal is 
expected to conclude its work by the year 2010.54
The second observation concerns the practical implications 
of the evidentiary questions raised by the Court’s decision. In 
light of how critical accurate and complete evidence is to the 
adequate resolution of a case — as well as to the perception of 
the Court’s opinion as a fair and credible adjudication of the 
issues in controversy — it may be worth exploring the idea of 
a separate fact-finding chamber of the Court dedicated solely to 
seeking and conducting a preliminary analysis of the best avail-
able evidence.
The final observation relates to the much broader question 
of whether the judgment will contribute to reconciliation in the 
region. This is a question that will no doubt be debated for years 
to come. One thing is clear, however, and that is the need for a 
clear and precise explanation of the Court’s verdict. Although 
the judgment has evoked passionate reactions on all sides, the 
better understood this judgment becomes, the better the chances 
that — despite the legal questions it has raised — it will contrib-
ute to some sort of reconciliation in the region.                HRB
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inquiry. Bosnian Genocide, 2007 I.C.J. at ¶ 217.
47 Bosnian Genocide, 2007 I.C.J. at ¶¶ 374-75. In coming  
to this conclusion, the Court also appears to have found  
significant prosecutorial decisions to withdraw or exclude genocidal 
charges from certain indictments. Id.
48 Notably, the Court also squarely rejected the ICTY’s analysis 
of the standard required to prove state control over persons or enti-
ties not among its official organs. Bosnian Genocide, 2007 I.C.J. at 
¶¶ 403-406 (rejecting the ICTY’s “overall control” test in favor of 
the “effective control” test announced in its earlier judgment in the 
case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27, 
1986)). 
49 Bosnian Genocide, 2007 I.C.J. at ¶ 405.
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and political suppression is relaxed. He also 
encouraged sustained regional involvement 
with the UN to address the root causes of 
unrest. The Security Council has responded 
by urging the Myanmar government and its 
opposition to work quickly towards recon-
ciliation. To help with this process, the UN 
dispatched Mr. Gambari to several regional 
states, including China, to continue devel-
oping a consensus committed to working 
for peace in Burma. Mr. Gambari was also 
invited to return to Burma this November. 
Additionally, the UN independent human 
rights expert on Myanmar will visit Burma 
to verify and report on alleged abuses dur-
ing the government crackdown. The effec-
tiveness of such steps remains to be seen, 
but the currently the UN appears to have 
put its faith in diplomacy rather than sanc-
tions to encourage Burmese liberalization 
and reconciliation.
working group CritiCizeS 
BlaCkwater ShootingS in iraQ
The UN Working Group on the Use 
of Mercenaries (the Working Group) 
expressed serious concern over the killing 
of ten Iraqi civilians by private security 
employees. The International Convention 
against the Use, Recruitment, Financing and 
Training of Mercenaries (the Convention) 
entered into force in 2001 and obligates 
states to regulate and control the use of 
private military forces around the world. 
The recent killings in Iraq have drawn 
attention to the increased use of private 
security forces. 
The Working Group’s statement 
expresses many major concerns related 
to the use of private security forces and 
exemplifies the international community’s 
desire to regulate their use. The statement 
criticizes the use of bilateral government 
agreements giving private forces immunity 
from prosecution for their actions. This 
immunity circumvents the Convention’s 
authority and weakens enforceability 
of its provisions. The Working Group 
calls on Member States to accede to the 
Convention, to avoid granting immunity to 
private forces, and to create internal moni-
toring mechanisms to ensure that these 
forces do not violate human rights.
The privatization of security and mili-
tary forces is one of the most divisive and 
controversial developments associated with 
economic globalization. Even some propo-
nents worry that the growing use of these 
forces represents a decline of traditional 
nation-state sovereignty. For years, private 
security forces have been involved in con-
flicts in Africa and Eastern Europe. Their 
reach has now increased, however. Private 
forces have even taken part in emergency 
relief programs in the United States.
The private security firm Blackwater is 
seeking to diversify its business by reach-
ing out to U.S. state and local governments 
that may lack infrastructure or capacity 
to respond to natural disasters and terror-
ist attacks. Blackwater, which contracted 
to provide relief services in New Orleans 
following 2005’s Hurricane Katrina, was 
lauded for its effectiveness but condemned 
for its expense. Critics also point out that 
using private firms to carry out traditional 
government functions carries an appear-
ance of vigilantism and could foster a 
perception that the U.S. government pays 
contractors to do its job, whether by pref-
erence or necessity. This same perception 
pervades reactions to U.S. use of private 
forces in Iraq.
The recent killings in Iraq and the 
Working Group’s response focus interna-
tional attention on this debate. The poten-
tial for human rights violations during 
conflict or natural disasters is high. The 
Working Group and other opponents of 
private forces assert that the lack of over-
sight and accountability of these forces 
makes them more likely to violate human 
rights than traditional government actors 
are. Opponents see stripping these forces 
of the immunity currently afforded them as 
one way to reduce this potential.       HRB
Brent D. Hessel, a J.D. candidate at the 
Washington College of Law, covers the United 
Nations for the Human Rights Brief.
50 Bosnian Genocide, 2007 I.C.J. at ¶¶ 374-375.
51 See supra n. 5.
52 Bosnian Genocide, 2007 I.C.J. at ¶¶ 447-449.
53 Under Article 94(2) of the ICJ’s Statute, a prevailing State may 
request the Security Council’s assistance in enforcing the Court’s 
orders. statute oF the international court oF Justice, supra n. 
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25, art. 94(2). Thus, Bosnia and Herzegovina could also use the 
judgment in an effort to get the United Nations Security Council to 
enforce the ICJ’s order.
54 See United Nations Security Council Resolution 1503,  
S/RES/1503, operative ¶ 7, 28 August 2003.
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